The record's largest executed grant — $66M inside a $210M airport campus — with a 1,325-job clawback whose clock has not started. S-41
The portfolio's largest completed public construction bet (~$210M program; ~$146M+ public by the announced stack) — and its contested case: a 2024 public trust crisis and mayor-imposed audit regime, a binding 1,325-job clawback whose clock has not yet started, and a completion deadline that passed in April 2025 with the extension paper trail not yet located. [Dated correction 2026-08-13 (Run 03, R3-1): the deadline sentence was true only of the UNAMENDED instrument — the operative completion deadline on 2025-04-29 was already 2026-12-31 (Third Amendment, eff. 2023-08-30) and is now 2028-12-31 (Fifth Amendment, eff. 2026-02-03); the deadline never lapsed uncured. See "The five amendments" below.] S-41 S-40 S-55 S-57
"Nearly 2,000 direct jobs" in the targeted aviation/aerospace industry, plus 3,400 indirect/induced per the Haas Center study, at a promotional average wage of "nearly $50,000." Decomposed in the City's own advocacy, the headline is one binding number plus three non-binding estimates: 1,325 direct jobs "subject to claw back" + 216 ESTIMATED industry jobs + 400 Hangar 1 jobs expressly "not a part of Project Titan." The clawback perimeter is 66% of the headline.
VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — alone — owes the jobs clawback: 1,325 jobs at a $44,461 average-wage floor, tested as best-7-of-10-year averages on a two-tier clock that starts five years after Hangar 4's completion and may not close until the 2050s. The rate is $49,811.32 per job short, reachable only through end-of-decade tests, a compliance-plan round, a 24-month force-majeure option, and five sole-discretion waiver grounds. The City's own repayment exposure sunsets six months after final disbursement — but it bears 50% of Triumph's enforcement attorneys' fees, uncapped.
The "fully funded" $210M stack was documented $44,875,000 short ten weeks before execution and closed in one week of February 2019, under a two-week corporate ultimatum from ST. Inflation then broke the 2016-priced budget — Hangar 3 rebid at $83.5M, Hangar 4 downsized ("may come with job reduction") — while the jobs headline stayed put. The 2024 Chilean-worker episode put a mayor-announced audit regime on the record with no visible output, and the six-year completion deadline passed in April 2025 with the extension paper trail not yet located. [Dated correction 2026-08-13 (Run 03, R3-1): the last clause described the unamended instrument — the deadline had been extended to 2026-12-31 in August 2023 and to 2028-12-31 effective February 2026, so it never lapsed; what tripped once (and was cured retroactively, two days early) was the Design/Build execution fuse. The five amendments also made the City surety for VT's $35M match — see the amendments block on the decision page.]
| Funder · recipient | Amount | Instrument · citations |
|---|---|---|
| Triumph Gulf Coast — Triumph Gulf Coast, Inc. City of Pensacola — ST Titan #120 (MRO campus, Pensacola International Airport) | $66,000,000 committed | Triumph GAA #120 — grant amount unchanged across all five amendments S-41 |
| State of Florida — FDOT (aviation) FDOT — grant (one line as amended) | $48,000,000 reported, not counted | stated stack line — GAA #120 replacement Exhibit C, Fifth Amendment (effective 2026-02-03) S-53 S-57 |
| Local government — City of Pensacola City of Pensacola (as amended) | $18,200,000 reported, not counted | stated stack line — GAA #120 replacement Exhibit C, Fifth Amendment (effective 2026-02-03) S-57 |
| Local government — Escambia County Escambia County (as amended) | $11,800,000 reported, not counted | stated stack line — GAA #120 replacement Exhibit C, Fifth Amendment (effective 2026-02-03) S-57 |
| State of Florida — Florida Commerce (DEO) — Job Growth Grant Fund DEO / Governor's Job Growth Grant Fund (as amended) | $18,875,000 reported, not counted | stated stack line — GAA #120 replacement Exhibit C, Fifth Amendment (effective 2026-02-03) S-53 S-57 |
| Federal & other — U.S. Economic Development Administration Federal EDA | $12,250,000 reported, not counted | stated stack line — GAA #120 replacement Exhibit C, Fifth Amendment (effective 2026-02-03) S-53 S-57 |
Rows are this decision's entries in the Money ledger; stages are never summed together.
GAA §5.2 stack: $66,000,000 Triumph + $15,000,000 City Matching Funds + $35,000,000 from the MRO Lessee (VT) + $94,125,000 other sources = $210,125,000 for Project Titan; the entire MRO Campus is estimated at $334,825,000. The City bears ALL cost overruns; the Grant is partial funding only.
The grant sequence, per the contemporaneous primary record: the Triumph board approved $56M on July 18, 2018 (contingent on all other funding by year-end, later extended to 2019-03-31) → term sheets at $56M (Oct 2018) → the City asked for an additional $12.5M on 2019-02-08 → the executed GAA (2019-04-29) is $66M, structured as $56M plus two $5M tranches contingent on Triumph's 2020/2021 state receipts (§9.6). The registry's "#120 · $66,000,000 · 2018-03-16" listing line carries a dated discrepancy annotation; the memo governs the sequence.
The "fully funded" project was $44,875,000 short ten weeks before execution — documented in the City's own words and table: actual committed funding stood at $165,250,000 of $210,125,000 in February 2019, because the application-stage forecast had not materialized (FDOT delivered $25M against a $50M request; Federal EDA $12.25M against $17M; JGGF Year-2 $10M against $15M; County $10M against $12M; the City itself over-delivered +$2M; and $10.125M was already disclosed short at application). …
The "fully funded" project was $44,875,000 short ten weeks before execution — documented in the City's own words and table: actual committed funding stood at $165,250,000 of $210,125,000 in February 2019, because the application-stage forecast had not materialized (FDOT delivered $25M against a $50M request; Federal EDA $12.25M against $17M; JGGF Year-2 $10M against $15M; County $10M against $12M; the City itself over-delivered +$2M; and $10.125M was already disclosed short at application). The closure plan was assembled in ONE WEEK: +$5M City + $5M County + a $20M further FDOT request + $2.375M City-anticipated + a $12.5M additional Triumph ask. Recorded neutrally: gap-closing is what diligent staff do; the record's contribution is that the announced stack and the assembled stack now both exist, dated.
The pressure clock, in the City's words: "by February 14, ST must be able to make a corporate decision about either proceeding with Project Titan in Pensacola or seeking an alternative to their business plans elsewhere" — a two-week corporate ultimatum cited to the board alongside the March 31 Triumph deadline. The same competitive-relocation dynamic recurs across the portfolio; temporal adjacency with the softening enforcement terms is recorded as fact, no causal claim made.
The jobs obligor is VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — alone. GAA §8.4(b): the MRO Lessee is "solely liable" for all performance clawbacks, paid directly to Triumph. The City's own clawback exposure covers city-breach events only and TERMINATES six months after final disbursement — but the City bears 50% of Triumph's attorneys' fees in any clawback enforcement against VT, with no cap stated. (This corrects the press's "either the city or ST" framing.)
The test: Tier 1 = 994 jobs (75% of 1,325) held as an ANNUAL AVERAGE for 7 of 10 years, in a review period that begins five years after Hangar 4's Date of Beneficial Occupancy; Tier 2 adds 331 on the same mechanics in a second 10-year period, with surplus-job banking. …
The test: Tier 1 = 994 jobs (75% of 1,325) held as an ANNUAL AVERAGE for 7 of 10 years, in a review period that begins five years after Hangar 4's Date of Beneficial Occupancy; Tier 2 adds 331 on the same mechanics in a second 10-year period, with surplus-job banking. Clawback: $49,811.32 per shortfall job ($66M ÷ 1,325), tested at the END of each decade-long period, with compliance-plan intermediation first.
If Hangar 4 reaches beneficial occupancy ~2027, Tier 1 resolves ~2042 and Tier 2 ~2052 — a 2019 grant whose final jobs test may close thirty-three years after signing. And Hangar 4, downsized in 2025 after inflation consumed the 2016-priced budget, is not complete.
A wage floor exists: $44,461 average annual wage, excluding benefits, every year — and wage compliance is required for jobs to count as "maintained." It is an AVERAGE, not a minimum, and sits below the "$50,000 average" of the promotional record. The three-figure sequence is preserved: $44,461 (term sheets) → $45,394 (Feb-2019 memo) → $44,461 (executed).
Mobile transfers count: "No Project Jobs may be transferred by VT from other parts of the STATE OF FLORIDA" — Alabama is not Florida, so jobs moved from the Mobile operation are countable "net new" Project Jobs under this instrument. …
Mobile transfers count: "No Project Jobs may be transferred by VT from other parts of the STATE OF FLORIDA" — Alabama is not Florida, so jobs moved from the Mobile operation are countable "net new" Project Jobs under this instrument. Recorded neutrally: standard Florida-statute framing, with a consequence the public narrative has never surfaced.
The record's single best documentary lever: GAA §7.3 deems all Back-up Data and §8.4 performance metrics "public records" under §119.011 — payroll records, employment reporting forms, quarterly RT-6 returns, audited financials, deliverable to Triumph on 10 days' request. …
The record's single best documentary lever: GAA §7.3 deems all Back-up Data and §8.4 performance metrics "public records" under §119.011 — payroll records, employment reporting forms, quarterly RT-6 returns, audited financials, deliverable to Triumph on 10 days' request. The verified job counts the 2024 audit regime was announced to produce ALREADY EXIST as contractually designated public records held by Triumph.
The completion deadline passed: GAA §5.1 required Project Titan complete within six years of the Effective Date — April 29, 2025, day-for-day force-majeure extension (the definition expressly includes "epidemics"). Titan is not complete. Not a breach finding — a paper-trail finding: either force majeure carried the date, or an extension letter exists, or post-4/2025 disbursements need a basis. The documentation is a first-order wanted item (W-15). [Dated correction 2026-08-13 (Run 03, R3-1): premise corrected — the deadline never arrived unextended. The Third Amendment (eff. 2023-08-30) extended §5.1 to 2026-12-31 twenty months before the original date; the Fifth (eff. 2026-02-03) extended it to 2028-12-31. W-15 is obtained (the extension instruments ARE the Third and Fifth Amendments); Q-15 is resolved. What DID trip — once — was the §3.2 Design/Build execution fuse on 2024-06-30, retroactively reinstated by the Fourth Amendment, executed two days before the trip date.]
§10.17: the Mayor (or designee) may amend, modify, or WAIVE any term on the City's behalf if not materially adverse to the City — non-material amendment authority sits with one office.
Comparing the October 2018 term sheets against the executed March/April 2019 instruments, the jobs-enforcement machinery moved in ONE direction at every point of change. Recorded as fact-by-comparison; no motive imputed — negotiation is negotiation. But the direction is uniform, and it is the portfolio's first DOCUMENTED instance of the term-sheet→instrument transition — the transition Birdon #367 is in today.
Grant amount: $56M → $66M (+$10M, tranched on future state receipts). City co-funding: ~$154.125M → ≥$144.125M (City share −$10M). Triumph share caps: 35%/27% → 40%/31.41% (Triumph carries more, earlier). CMAR guaranteed-maximum-price deadline: 2020-12-31 → 2021-12-31, moved a year before signing.
Tier 1 structure: create 994 jobs within 3 YEARS of Hangar 4 occupancy and maintain EACH job ≥3 years — became — a 5-year ramp-up, then a 10-year review period holding an ANNUAL AVERAGE of 994 for 7 of 10 years (creation window +2 years; per-job maintenance → averaged best-7-of-10). …
Tier 1 structure: create 994 jobs within 3 YEARS of Hangar 4 occupancy and maintain EACH job ≥3 years — became — a 5-year ramp-up, then a 10-year review period holding an ANNUAL AVERAGE of 994 for 7 of 10 years (creation window +2 years; per-job maintenance → averaged best-7-of-10). Tier 2's window grew six years and gained surplus-job banking.
Annual clawback triggers ELIMINATED: the term sheets repaid 1/5 of the grant in ANY YEAR the average fell below 795, and per-job amounts annually between 795 and 993; the executed instrument tests only at the END of each 10-year review period, with Compliance-Plan intermediation before termination remedies. …
Annual clawback triggers ELIMINATED: the term sheets repaid 1/5 of the grant in ANY YEAR the average fell below 795, and per-job amounts annually between 795 and 993; the executed instrument tests only at the END of each 10-year review period, with Compliance-Plan intermediation before termination remedies. The per-job rate grew with the grant: $42,264.15 → $49,811.32.
Escape valves widened: force-majeure triggers 2 → 7 (adding regulatory/policy change, air-service disruption, loss of a major key account, early fleet retirement, named hurricanes, and "tight labor market affecting recruitment"); Triumph sole-discretion waiver grounds 3 → 5 (adding policy change/customer loss and "demonstrated reasonable best efforts"). Unchanged: the $44,461 wage floor, the intra-Florida-only transfer exclusion, and the guaranty architecture (VT solely liable; Triumph third-party beneficiary of the MRO Lease; City bears 50% of enforcement fees).
Net effect (inference, flagged): between October 2018 and April 2019 the obligation kept its headline number (1,325 @ $44,461) while its testing regime moved from annual, per-job, short-window enforcement to averaged, banked, end-of-decade enforcement with five additional escape valves. The public-facing promise was constant; the machinery beneath it loosened.
The deadline ledger. Completion Deadline (§5.1): April 29, 2025 (executed GAA, six years + day-for-day force majeure) → December 31, 2026 (Third Amendment, eff. 2023-08-30 — executed twenty months BEFORE the original date arrived) → December 31, 2028 (Fifth Amendment, eff. 2026-02-03). Cumulative movement: +44 months, continuous paper, no gap. Design/Build execution deadline (§3.2): June 30, 2022 → 2023 → 2024 → 2025 across the First–Fourth Amendments; this fuse actually reached zero once — 2024-06-30 — and the Fourth Amendment (eff. 2024-06-28) is the cure: a prophylactic retroactive reinstatement, executed two days before the trip date, expressly acknowledging the Grant "could automatically be rescinded and revoked."
The scope ledger. …
The scope ledger. Project Titan's hangar scope ran: four hangars at fixed square footages (H2 173k / H3 191k / H4 191k, executed GAA) → Hangar 2 ~177k plus a COMBINED Hangar 3 (~176k) and Hangar 4 (~176k) (First Amendment, 2021) → Hangar 2 plus "ONE TO TWO additional Hangar(s) having between approximately 166,900 and 333,800 square feet" (Third Amendment, 2023) — the hangar count itself became elastic: as of 2023-08-30 the instrument permits a completed Titan of H2 plus one additional hangar. The metric-preservation clause (design changes shall not relieve the 1,325) is carried intact at every step.
The jobs question, answered in text: the Fifth Amendment's replacement §5.3 RESTATES "not less than the 1,325 Tier 1 and Tier 2 net new jobs outlined in the MRO Performance Agreement" — post-downsize, effective 2026-02-03 — and adds a new lever: failure to make "substantial progress" toward the 1,325 is grounds for Triumph to suspend or terminate any UNFUNDED portion of the Grant. No amendment touches the number, the tiers, the $44,461 floor, or any Performance Agreement mechanic. But every PA clock anchors to Hangar 4's beneficial occupancy, so each completion-deadline extension silently moved the test's earliest start (H4 DBO now projected ~2027–28; Tier 1 resolving ~2042–43; Tier 2 into the 2050s) — the headline survived untouched while its maturity moved years, with no change to a single word of the jobs text.
Enforcement diff, GAA baseline → present — every mechanic, by direction (parallel to the term-sheet→instrument table above). SOFTER, to the performer side: D/B execution deadline (three extensions, then the trip-and-cure); Completion Deadline (+44 months); hangar scope (count itself elastic); Triumph's pre-completion disbursement cap (≤40% → ≤50%); the first-dollar gate (H3/H4 permit gates → proof of substantial completion of Hangar 2). UNCHANGED: the 1,325 / tiers / $44,461 / $49,811.32-per-job clawback text — and ALL of VT/ST's own mechanics (seven force-majeure triggers, five waiver grounds, compliance plan, 24-month option), untouched since 2019 through five consents that only ratify, of which the two most recent are BLANK in the published record.
HARDER — and every new control lands on the CITY: eight new default/repayment grounds (p)–(w), including default on PROJECTED lateness ("objectively unlikely" to complete on time); anti-double-recovery; final disbursement gated on ALL matching funds spent; an 18-month document-staleness rule (documents older than 18 months may not back disbursement or count as Matching Funds); a 5% budget-variance approval regime whose 60-day silence default is DISAPPROVAL; failure to spend matching funds deemed MATERIAL BREACH — with the City agreeing to "spend, or CAUSE MRO LESSEE TO SPEND," all Matching Funds, making the City surety for VT's own $35M match; Triumph setoff/retention rights against future disbursements (§10.4); and a notice-completeness gate under which no Triumph deadline commences until Triumph's own program administrator confirms the request complete (§10.11) — including the 60-day deemed-disapproval clock.
The Exhibit C reset — held as two readings, neither adopted: the Fifth Amendment's exhibit ("Detail of Project Account to Date") shows ZERO planning-and-construction activity for 2019–2023 and re-times the entire $210,125,000 into CY2024–2028, while the Third Amendment's same-titled exhibit showed ≈$66.32M through CY2023. Reading (a): a restatement of COUNTABLE spend under the new 18-month staleness rule — under which ~$66M of previously scheduled/reported spend fell out of countability at a stroke. Reading (b): a forward disbursement/timing schedule that abandoned the actuals-to-date format without saying so. The instrument does not say which (monitored question Q-17).
Net direction (inference, flagged — single-decision evidence): across seven years of #120 amendments, every relaxation accrues to the project/performer side and every new control binds the public grantee; the private obligor's machinery has not moved one word since execution. Proposed as a refinement of portfolio pattern P5 — not yet portfolio-verified.
Worker account: recruited in Chile; understood long-term roles, some allege green-card promises; terminated about a year in; deportation exposure; one worker reports $180k+ debt from the move. Scale discrepancy preserved: 40 / "at least 50" / 60 (Pensacola) vs "more than 300" (operation-wide incl. Mobile) across outlets.
Company account (William Hafner, VT MAE Chief Integration Officer): "No one was laid off" — work authorizations expired; workers were skilled gap-fillers; the company is pursuing alternative visas. Third-party account (Hispanic Resource Center): a visa-type mismatch alleged, with paperwork errors allegedly blocking re-employment.
City response (Mayor Reeves, 2024-09-09): third-party review of local recruitment, independent QUARTERLY audits of job-creation numbers, residency verification — "our trust has been shaken" — while simultaneously accepting the company's own account of being ahead on job counts: "I take them at their word." No retrieved source confirms any audit was completed, published, or continued after September 2024.
The episode implicates labor-sourcing and LOCALNESS of jobs, not (on current evidence) the raw job count. The record holds three separate questions — count performance (claimed), composition/residency (contested), verification (announced, output unseen) — and does not collapse them.
Q-10 — Titan's job data is already a public record: a Ch.119 request to Triumph for #120 Back-up Data and performance reporting is the highest-value request in the portfolio, because the entitlement is written into the instrument. And did the 2024 audit regime produce anything?
Q-11 — Has GAA #120 been amended? The GAA says design changes shall not relieve the metrics, so absent an amendment VT owes 1,325 jobs against a smaller campus — while the city's own framing concedes the downsized Hangar 4 "may come with job reduction."
Q-12 — Which legal entity carries the obligations after the January 2026 rename to "ST Engineering – Pensacola Aerospace," and what counts as one of the 1,325? Q-13 — the $44,461 average wage floor: measured how, against what baseline? Q-14 — was the Aerospace Academy MOU (up to 50 local residents/yr × 5 yrs) executed and performed — and did a separate academy application ever appear in Triumph's award list? Q-15 — where is the §5.1 extension/force-majeure paper?
[Dated append 2026-08-13 — Run 03.] The set now runs Q-10–Q-19. …
[Dated append 2026-08-13 — Run 03.] The set now runs Q-10–Q-19. Q-15 is RESOLVED, premise corrected (R3-1): the extension paper exists — it is the Third and Fifth Amendments themselves; the deadline never lapsed uncured. Q-11 is resolved AS TO TEXT (1,325 restated 2026-02-03) and remains open as to effect. New: Q-16 — the Extension Agreement approved by Triumph 2020-06-19, recited in the chain but not among the published amendments; Q-17 — the Exhibit C reset (which reading, and what happened to the ≈$66.32M?); Q-18 — do signed VT consents to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments exist, given both published "fully executed" copies carry blank consent blocks?; Q-19 — is "the Company" in amended §5.3 an anchored defined term?
(QC-A′, superseding Run 01's QC-A as top target.) GAA §7.3, final sentence: all Back-up Data and §8.4 performance metrics "shall be deemed 'public records' under Section 119.011." Back-up Data (PA §2(m)) = payroll records, employment reporting forms, quarterly RT-6 returns, audited financials — deliverable to Triumph on 10 days' request. The verified job counts Run 01 hoped the mayor's 2024 audits might produce ALREADY EXIST as contractually-designated public records held by Triumph — a Ch.119 request to TRIUMPH for #120 Back-up Data and performance reporting is the highest-value request in the portfolio, because the entitlement is written into the instrument itself. Also still open (Run 01 QC-A, unchanged): did the 2024 mayor-announced audit regime (third-party recruitment review, quarterly audits, residency verification) produce anything? No output located; commissioned? delivered? public? → Ch.119 to the City for the review contract and all audit deliverables (wanted W-18).
(QC-B, elevated by Run 02 to the central Titan question.) Has GAA #120 / the Performance Agreement been amended — for the H4 downsizing, the schedule, or job definitions? (Triumph agendas show amendment practice is routine.) Run 02 sharpens the stakes: GAA §3.1 says design changes shall not relieve the metrics ("MRO Lessee's ability to satisfy the performance metrics … shall not be materially adversely affected"), so the 2025 H4 downsize does NOT automatically reduce the 1,325 — absent an amendment, VT owes 1,325 against a smaller campus, while the city's own framing concedes the smaller H4 "may come with job reduction." Whether an amendment exists is unknown. Founder will supply the amendments (all five) via Run 03 (wanted W-14). [Dated append 2026-08-13, WO-013 — ST Titan Run 03 §5, verbatim:] RESOLVED AS TO TEXT: 1,325 restated in GAA §5.3 as amended 2026-02-03, with a new substantial-progress suspension lever [S-57 §5]; no instrument amends the PA, the tiers, or the $44,461 floor; the City's 2025 "may come with job reduction" acknowledgment (Run 01) never entered any instrument. REMAINS OPEN AS TO EFFECT: the H4-DBO anchor means the extensions deferred the test years without touching the jobs text; and whether 1,325 is achievable against the downsized campus is an outcome question (status: too_early), not a text question. [QC-B — this question's run-level candidate designation — RESOLVED, same append: five amendments exist and are now extracted; none adjusts the metric.]
(QC-C.) Which legal entity carries the Pensacola obligations (VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — an Alabama corporation, n/k/a "ST Engineering – Pensacola Aerospace"? STENA? parent guaranty?), and what do the GAA's job DEFINITIONS say about residency, transfers, and visa-status workers? The Chilean episode makes the definition load-bearing: 1,325 of WHAT counts? Run 02 partially resolves the definitional level: "Project Jobs" = net new, private-sector, FTE (2,080 man-hours/yr), in Escambia County, per §288.106(2)(i) F.S.; NO intra-Florida transfers count — but Alabama is not Florida, so jobs moved from Mobile are countable (H-1 resolved at the definitional level). Still open: the entity question itself — PA §4.2 permits assignment to a merging entity or affiliate on prompt written notice, so the Jan-2026 rename should have generated an assignment/merger notice IF any entity change occurred (wanted W-16).
(QC-D, as revised by Run 02's finding.) A wage floor EXISTS: PA §2(a)(2) requires the average annual wage of Project Jobs ≥ $44,461 excl. benefits, every year, and wage compliance is required for jobs to count as "maintained." Open remainder: the floor is an AVERAGE, not a minimum — against what baseline is the promotional "nearly $50,000 average" measured, and how does $44,461 relate (if at all) to the 115% prevailing-wage form Triumph's post-2023 deals carry (Q-03)? The three-figure sequence is preserved: $44,461 (term sheets, Oct 2018) → $45,394 (memo, Feb 2019) → $44,461 (executed PA, Mar 2019) — the binding number reverted to the LOWER figure at execution (C-STE-B3).
(QC-E.) PA §4.11–4.12: Triumph + VT jointly fund an Aerospace Academy MOU — local-education partnerships, Workforce Escarosa pipeline, veteran track; training for UP TO 50 LOCAL RESIDENT candidates annually for 5 years. Was the MOU executed? Did the Academy run? (2021 press mentions ST "exploring" an Aviation Training Academy of 150 grads/yr — a THIRD number distinct from the binding 50/yr; promise-vs-binding again.) Plus Addendum B's separate-application check (C-STE-B10): the memo frames an "Aerospace Airman Academy" as "a separate project from Project Titan" eligible to apply for Triumph funding — did a separate academy application ever appear in Triumph's award list? Check at Run 03 / registry sweep.
(QC-F.) GAA §5.1: the City "agrees to complete Project Titan within six (6) years after the Effective Date" → April 29, 2025, with day-for-day force-majeure extension (the definition expressly includes "epidemics" — COVID squarely qualifies). Titan is NOT complete (H3 due 2H2026; H4 contracted 4/2025). Consequence if missed: Triumph's obligation to make FUTURE disbursements expires unless a written extension was requested and granted BEFORE expiration. Either force majeure carried the date, or an extension letter exists, or post-4/2025 disbursements need a basis. NOT a breach finding — a PAPER-TRAIL finding: the extension / force-majeure documentation must exist; locate it (wanted W-15). [Dated append 2026-08-13, WO-013 — ST Titan Run 03 §5, verbatim:] RESOLVED, PREMISE CORRECTED: §5.1 was extended by the Third Amendment (eff. 2023-08-30) to 2026-12-31 — twenty months before the original 2025-04-29 date — and by the Fifth Amendment (eff. 2026-02-03) to 2028-12-31 [S-55 §4; S-57 §3]. The deadline never lapsed uncured; Run 02 §0.6 and MCv4 described the unamended instrument (correction R3-1). The lapse in the chain was the §3.2 D/B EXECUTION deadline, which tripped 2024-06-30 and was retroactively reinstated by the Fourth Amendment (eff. 2024-06-28) [S-56 §2]. "What was given in exchange" for the 2028 extension: nothing from the performer; the Fifth Amendment pairs the extension with a City-side control regime (C-STE-0056–0063). STATUS: closed as asked; successor questions Q-16/Q-17 opened. [QC-F — this question's run-level candidate designation — SUPERSEDED by this resolution, same subject.]
(QC-R03-1, Run 03 §5 verbatim.) The Extension Agreement approved by Triumph 2020-06-19 (recited from the Third Amendment onward; not among the published amendments): what did it extend, and why does it first appear in recitals three years later? → W-21. (Context, C-STE-0044: the First and Second Amendment recitals omit it; the Third, Fourth, and Fifth all enumerate it as amendment (i) in the chain.)
(QC-R03-2, Run 03 §5 verbatim — the run's sharpest new question.) The Exhibit C reset (C-STE-0065): under which reading — and if (a), what happened to the ≈$66.32M shown expended through 2023? Did previously-reported Matching Funds fall out of countability under §4.3, and does the City's audited reporting reflect a restatement? Targets: City ACFR/airport fund; Triumph program-administrator correspondence (itself reachable via the §7.3 public-records designation). (The two readings, neither adopted — C-STE-0065: (a) restatement of COUNTABLE spend under the new §4.3 staleness rule; (b) a forward disbursement/timing schedule that abandoned the actuals-to-date format without saying so. The instrument does not say which.)
(QC-R03-3, Run 03 §5 verbatim.) The unexecuted consents: do signed VT consents to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments exist outside the published "fully executed" copies? If not, what is the effect of amendments to which the PA obligor never consented — given the PA is unamended and §3.2/§5.1 changes materially alter the schedule its clocks reference? (Recorded as a document-status question, not a legal conclusion.) (Consent-degradation sequence, §2: pre-signed 77 days early (1st), undated (2nd, 3rd), entirely blank (4th, 5th) — stress-log item 19.)
(QC-R03-4, Run 03 §5 verbatim — minor.) "The Company" in amended §5.3: confirm the GAA defines it (presumably = MRO Lessee/VT); if undefined, drafting artifact worth a line in the record. (The clause is the new 1,325 substantial-progress suspension lever, C-STE-0061 — which is why the defined-term check matters at all.)
Verified edges are supported by an executed document. Proposed and reported edges describe instruments that are drafted, approved-but-nonbinding, or stated publicly. Inferred edges are the project's own reading of the record, labeled as such.
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